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CHAPTER T
INTRODUCTION
Sometime during the sixth century B.C., isonomia 
became a political slogan of the common people of Athens 
and other Greek cities."*' When the common people called 
for isonomia, they seemed to be saying that the law should 
become communal. "The law was now the common property of 
all the citizens,"^ said Fustel de Coulanges after describ­
ing the rise of the common people. Isonomia was the slogan 
used against the rule of the noble classes. Isonomia 
translated means "equality before the law." It must be 
seen as part of the general movement from aristocracy to 
democracy in archaic Greece.
Against the rule of the nobility the urge 
towards equality among the citizens that 
was inherent in the concept of"the polis 
steadily gained ground.3
The common people who desired this equality of political
rights felt they could get it through equality before the
law.
^M. I. Finley, The Ancient Greeks (New y0rk: The 
Viking Press, 1963), p. 42.
^Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (Garden 
City: Doubleday), p. 308.
^Victor Ehrenberg,' The" Greek Way (Hew York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, I960), p..
2
The lower classes had been previously shut out
from the political realm.^ During the Mycenaean and
*
Homeric ages they had been ruled by kings and nobles.
The rulers were originally priest-kings, not only holding 
political power, but religious power as well. One of 
the reasons the lower classes did not have political 
rights was that they had no religion of their own. But 
as they acquired a worship, they gained political rights 
also.
The multitudes, previously without a worship, 
thenceforth had religious ceremonies, and 
festivals. They could pray; this, in a 
society where religion made the dignity of a 
man, was a great deal.-5
The people, now with a worship, felt strong; for 
they dared enter the city, the sacred polis, where they had 
long been forbidden. They won themselves religious free­
dom, and subsequently, political freedom. They entered 
the public life of the city and "the result was everywhere 
the same; the inferior classes entered the city, and be­
came a part of the body p o l i t i c , T h e  slogan for this 
movement was equality before the law, isonomia, and with 
it they attempted to gain full political rights. The
^Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, p.'274.
5Ibid., p. 275.
^Ibid.
3
thought which this-movement generated is the subject of 
this paper.
The fact is that hardly any student of political 
thought has even heard of the term isonomia, and those 
that have go no further at an explanation than to trans­
late it from the Greek into the English. Even Plato, who 
wrote only a generation after it was a fundamental concept 
to Greek thought, hardly even mentions it. The problem of 
the paper then is, first, to interpret the term isonomia 
in the light of such fundamental political concepts as 
rule, law, and action. Secondly, it is important to learn 
the fundamental political concepts in the way the Greeks 
understood them before Plato. In the absence of systematic 
political theory, one begins to approach these concepts by 
the rediscovery of political language found in the poetry, 
the plays, and the histories of classical Greece; we need 
to read the literature of a generation, and not just the 
works of the first political theorist. Most political 
scientists do not understand isonomia because they do not 
possess the concepts by which to understand it. The orig­
inal political thought of Greece has been lost, and it is
i
the purpose of this paper to attempt a recovery of it in 
the literature of the ancient Greeks before Plato.
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The most obvious interpretation of isonomia is a
literal translation from the Greek into English. Isonomia
translates as "equality before the law;" from the roots
"isos" which means equality and from "nomos" which means 
7law. Traditionally, Victor Ehrenberg, Donald Kagan and
others claim that isonomia expressed the political ideal
0
which, became institutionalized into democracy. Ehrenberg
in his Greek State says of isonomia:
Against tyranny and against the oligarchic rule 
of the rich families was raised the plain 
demand for isonomia which’--whether as 'equality 
of distribution’ or 'equality before the law’-- 
became the expressive symbol of a democratic 
constitution,^
Certainly the traditional interpretation has its 
support from ancient Greek sources. Equality was obviously 
an important idea to the democratic Greeks, for Greek lit­
erature is filled with references to its virtues. Demosthenes, 
a democratic Greek orator, praises Athenian law because it', 
was equal for all.
It forbids the introduction of any law that does 
not affect all citizens alike. As everyman has 
an equal share in the constitution, so this 
statue asserts his equal share in the law.
^Gregory Vlastos, "Isonomia," American Journal of 
Philogy, Vol. 79, 1954, p. 173.
8Donald Kagan, Sour Ces in Greek Political Thought 
(New York: The Free Press, 106577
^Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p. 51.
lODemosthenes, Aga inst Timocrates (as quoted in 
Kagan, Sources), p. 37. .
Pericles is made to say by Thucydides, during the famous 
funeral oration, "If we look to the laws, they afford equal 
justice for all."^
We can well understand from these short quotations 
that isonomia meant "equality before the law." As Donald 
Kagan has said,' "Isonomia has several shades of meaning, 
but at the very least it meant .equality before the law."^ 
And if we understand law to mean "rules governing actions," 
then it is no wonder that the term "isonomia" has dropped 
out of sight, for modern democracies all profess a belief 
in equality before the law, at least as an operational 
ideal. But if Hannah Arendt's view of isonomia is correct, 
we see a form of government rather than an operational 
ideal, and it is a form of government contradicted by 
modern democracies,
Hannah Arendt's interpretation of the term isonomia 
is linked with the notion of " n o - r u l e . M o s t  political 
theorists, Arendt claims, operate under the assumption "that 
every political community consists of those who rule and 
those who are r u l e d an(j this has been going on since
HThucydides Cii» 37.1)
12Kagan, Sources, p. 77.
13Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking 
Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 22^23T
1 4Ibid .
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Plato and Aristotle. One of the problems with traditional
interpretations is that they look at isonomia through this
♦
notion of rule. Where others see isonomia as leading to 
democracy, as majority rule or the domination of lower 
class over the upper class, Arendt describes isonomia as 
creating "no-rule," or cooperation of all people regardless 
of class.
Arendt*s discussion of isonomia is found in a
passage on political freedom. While freedom has been an
obscure term at best and has come to be associated with
nonpolitical activities that a given body politic will 
1 ̂protect, for the ancient Greeks freedom was a political
phenomenon; it allowed the citizens to participate in
political activities.
Since Herodotus, freedom was understood as a 
form of political organization in which the 
citizens lived together under conditions of 
no-rule, without a division between rulers
and ruled. This notion of no-rule was ex­
pressed by the word isonomia.16
Freedom was for the ancient Greeks a solid political idea,
where freedom meant to be free to participate in political
activities, instead of being free from political activities.
The polls Ccity-state) was to be an "isonomy," a space of
15 Ibid. 
16Ibid.
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no-rule rather than a democracy', a space for majority 
17rule.
■ *
Hannah Arendt has some support in Walter Jones’ 
book on Greek legal theory. Though Jones agrees that 
isonomia was not concerned with rule, he goes back to the 
traditional approach in the end. Jones comes close to 
Arendt’s interpretation, when he says, "It was not rule, 
even by the people which was the objective, so much as the 
equality in and through the law which was thought to be 
inseparable from it--the isonomia.
Arendt, too, seems to have the support of classical 
sources. Euripides, in his' Suppliant Maidens, has Theseus, 
the legendary founder of Athenian democracy, speak these 
words:
This city is free, and ruled by no one man 
The. people reign in annual succession.
They do not yield power to the rich;
The poor man has an equal share in it.-*-9
A discussion by the Peri's an generals in Herodotus’ history
centers around the varied forms of government, which by
general assent are defined as rule, by one, rule by few,
and rule by many. Otanes, the spokesman for rule by many,
17Herodotus, The Persian Wars Ciii, 80-83).
18Jon Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 86.
19Euripides, Suppliant Maidens, lines 405-408.
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which is here called isonomia Cuthe rules by many, on the
2 0other hand has the fairest of names, isonomia") is
offered a kingdom but refuses. He answers:
Now as I have neither a mind to rule or be ruled 
I shall not enter the lists with you in this matter.
I withdraw on one condition--none of you shall 
exercise rule over me or my seed forever.21
The rest agreed to these terms, and Herodotus claims that 
to that day the family of Otanes remained the only free 
house in Persia. These two sources demonstrate the connec­
tion between no-rule and freedom that was felt to exist in 
Greek thought.
It is important to understand the differences 
between these ideas of rule and no-rule. One interpreta­
tion of isonomia includes the idea of rule, that is that 
all political communities must be divided into those who 
rule and those who are ruled, The value of rule according 
to this view is that it allows men to escape the chaotic 
nature of political action, into the order imposed by a 
ruler.
The concept of rule is the notion that men can 
lawfully and politically live together only when 
some are entitled to command and others to obey.22
^Herodotus (iii> 80-83),
23-Ibid.
22Arendt, On Revolution, p. 21.
9
Without this rule there is a chaotic state which is to be 
avoided. The cost, however, is political freedom. To 
escape its uncertainty some wish to find a substitute for 
the action of the people in public. The substitute was 
for one or a few to rule and for the rest to mind their 
own business while obeying the ruler’s commands.
Some of the ancient Greeks felt that within a 
political community no one should rule or be ruled. Those
people who believed in isonomia claimed that it was best
23for ’’men to be ruled by none.” It was thought that where
there was rule there was no state at all. Sophocles wrote,
for example, that "a one man state is no state at all,
Likewise, according to Aristotle,
. . .  in a group whose members are equal and 
peers it is neither expedient nor just that 
one man should rule over others.2^
Though Aristotle wrote several generations after the time 
of Sophocles, he was writing about the same kind of no­
rule.
If most interpretations of isonomia claim that it 
leads to democracy, as majority rule, they seem to be 
missing the whole point of what the political space was
23Aristotle, Politics, 1288a2.
24sophocles, Antigone, trans. Paul Roche (New York: 
New American Library, 1958), p. 189.
2^Aristotle, Politics, 1288a2.
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all about. As Arendt says, rule belonged in the private
realm, not in the public. It was equality before the law
that was important in the public realm, and Greek law was
originally only a public affair.2  ̂ Isonomia can thus be
seen as an attempt to give the whole citizen body equal
political rights of participation, not an attempt at
majority rule. Rule was to be absent from the political
space altogether. The political space was to be, as
■ *Arendt says, a space for freedom, which she claims meant 
no-rule.
My method is to read much of the literature of the 
ancient Greeks, with political eyes trained by Ms. Arendt. 
Aristotle*s works are included in my primary sources be^ 
cause I sense a strong historical legacy in his writings 
which reflect the political thought of the Greeks genera­
tions before his time. Most of my sources are the plays 
and poetry of the ancient Greeks. The problem was whether 
they were giving me a true idea of the political thought 
of the time I was studying. It always appears at first 
glance that Greek political thought must be approached 
through Plato and his pupil, Aristotle. There are others 
besides myself who think otherwise. Edith Hamilton, in
2(\Arendt, On Revolution, p. 61.
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her book, The Greek Way, wrote "the dramatists’ task was 
to interpret and express the great communal emotion."2^
The playwright and the poet express in prose and poetry 
what is happening around them. The artist perceives the 
life and thought of his culture and presents' it in art 
form.
It is not necessary to assume that political
thought began with Plato and Aristotle, This approach
to Greek political thought leaves out an abundance of
literature that can be considered. Many of these literary
sources date generations before Plato wrote his first works.
Donald Kagan, in his Sources in’ Greek Political Theory, uses
the same kind of argument when he writes,
All too often the study of our subject begins 
and ends with Plato and Aristotle. It is my 
hope to call attention to works less frequently 
considered and thus correct the distortion 
caused by this approach, giving us a clearer 
and truer picture of what the Greeks thought.2**
By considering the plays and poetry of the Greeks, much of
it written before the time of Plato and Aristotle, an old
dimension is again added to the study of the thought of
the Greeks.
The argument of this paper can be seen as progress­
ing through various stages, from the realm of the household,
2^Ehrenberg, The Greek Way, p. 180.
28Kagan, Sources, P. vii.
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before the polis, to a time when the polis was fundamental 
to Greek life. First, the way of the private realm will 
he discussed. Next, we will discuss what set off the 
private from the public realm. Finally, we will discuss 
what went on in the public realm that was unique to it.
As the argument progresses, the metaphor of law as a wall 
or boundary marker will be seen as central to the thesis.
The private realm, characterized by violence, existed 
outside the walls of law, as it were, where equality before- 
the law, or no-rule was not possible. The polis, on the 
other hand, was enclosed by this wall-like law. It shut 
out the violence and inequality of the private realm and 
enclosed a space for free speech and equality of political 
rights.
Tyranny rested on the reduction of these walls to 
enclose only the tyrant and his lackeys; isonomia attempted 
to enlarge these walls to enclose all the citizens. Within 
the space enclosed by law, political action was to take •< 
place. Under a tyranny then only the tyrant was able to 
act, but under isonomia all citizens were free to partici­
pate in political action.
CHAPTER II
THE POLIS AND THE HOUSEHOLD
Nobody complains about the fog. I know why now: 
as bad as it is, you can slip back in it and feel 
safe. He keeps trying to drag us out of the fog, 
out in the open, where we'd be easy to get at.
It's like that big red hand of McMurphy's is 
reaching into the fog, and dropping down and dragging 
men up by their hands, dragging them blinking into 
the open. First one, then another, then the next.
Right on down the line of Acutes, dragging them out 
of the fog, till there they stand, all twenty of 
them, raising not just against watching TV but 
against her trying to send McMurphy to Disturbed,
against the way she's talked and acted and beat
them down for years.-^Ken Kesey
The ancient Greek town evolved into a community 
which consisted of two separate parts. Within this community 
there existed both a space fqr private needs, such as food, 
clothing and shelter, and for public needs, such as being 
seen and heard by others. The private space, the household, 
was the secure space within which to satisfy the biological 
necessities of life. The public space drew the people out
of the seclusion and fear of the dark places of the house­
hold, into the light of day and the new reality received 
by appearing before others. The household, which was 
characterized by rule and inequality, became contrasted 
to the public space characterized by no^rule and equality.
13
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Historically the household came first. Aristotle wrote 
that a "polis is constituted by the association of families 
and villages in a perfect and self-sufficient existence."1 
The freemen of the families and villages began to meet in 
assemblies in public which evolved into the polis. The 
polis was to give the Greek a space for political action. 
While the household had given the Greek father the neces­
sities for his family's life, it had kept him separated 
from others. The polis evolved into a space where men could 
come together, free from necessities.
The household represented some kind of physical 
structure, in which each unit was separated from each other. 
Such household was, to a high degree, self-sufficient, and, 
therefore, isolated from other households. Because of this 
physical structure, the household was a private space, not 
to be interfered with by outsiders.
Private space, the life of the household, was the 
space for the activities necessary for the survival of the 
species. This space was a pre-political place, where men . 
lived together because they were driven by their wants and 
needs. Each household was responsible for the biological
1Aristotle, Politics, 1255b6.
? ’Ehrenberg, The Greek State, p. 12.
15
7needs of food, clothing and shelter for its members. The
i
household was a place of necessity where man labored and 
worked with his tools. Here the slaves and free workers 
grew grain and built shelters and made cloth.
Members of the household were not equal, but in a 
master-slave, relationship which, as Aristotle explains, is 
a "ruling and being ruled which not only belongs to the 
category of things necessary, but also to that of things 
e x p e d i e n t . T h e  inequality present in the household was 
felt to be the correct way to run the household. The master 
ruled over his household because it was necessary for the 
survival of the family. Force was seen as the only way to 
master necessity. The driving force in the household was 
life itself, and not any kind of "higher" objective. Being 
on a survival level, life in the household was ruled by 
necessity, where force and violence were seen as the only 
means to master the necessities of life--for instance, by 
ruling over slaves and to become free. Force and violence 
were used to "liberate oneself from the necessities of life 
for the freedom of the world."5 Once the necessities of 
life had been mastered, the freemen of the polis could meet 
together in the common world of things.
3see Aristotle, Politics. Book I, ch. 3-9 for a 
discussion of the household.
4lbid. 1254a2.
5Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 30.
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The household was the space for rule. According to 
Fustel de Coulangee, all Greek and Latin words which express 
some rulership over others, such as rex, pater, anax, 
basileus, refer originally to household relationships and 
were names the slaves gave to their masters.^ The whole 
concept of rule was felt to have been born within.the house­
hold, where necessity ruled the lives of the people and the 
master ruled over his slaves to provide those things neces­
sary for survival. As Arendt puts it:
the whole concept of rule and being ruled, of 
government and power in the sense in which we 
understand them, was felt to be prepolitical 
■ and to belong in the private rather than the 
public sphere.7
The public sphere was the realm of freedom, where the free­
men met together to speak and act on common problems, but 
only after they had mastered the necessities of life, which 
they did by the prepolitical means of ruling over their 
households.
What was characteristic of life in the household 
is reflected by Hesiod and Thucydides, who stress the vio­
lence, strife, and uncertainty of private life. Hesiod 
describes the pre-polis experience in the form of a fable,
^Coulanges, The Ancient City, pp. 89, 228.
7Arendt, The Human ’Condition, p. 32.
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This is what the hawk said when he had caught a 
nightingale
With spangled neck in his claws and carried her 
high among the clouds
She, spotted on the clawhooks was wailing pitifully
But the hawk, in his masterful manner, gave her an 
answer:
"What is the matter with you? Why scream? Your 
master has you.
You shall go wherever I take you, for all your 
singing.
If I like, I can let you go. If I like, I can 
eat you for dinner.
He is a fool who tries to match his strength with 
the stronger.
He will lose his battle, and with shame will be 
hurt also."
So spoke the hawk, the bird who flies so fast on 
his long wings.^
Thucydides tells us that outside the walls of the polis, that 
is, outside the realm of politics, "the strong did what they 
could, and the weak did what they must."^ The private realm
^Hesiod,"Works and Days" as taken from Kagan, Sources. 
^Thucydides, The Pelopennesians War (ii, 34-38).
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was characterized by this use of force. Might made right. 
Some people were seen and saw themselves as superior to 
others, just as the hawk.was superior to the nightingale. 
The master was to have complete control.
While the households were separated from each other,
they were also separated from the public space. What was
private was to be isolated from what was public, or common
to all. The polis on the other hand,
gives each individual his due place in the polit­
ical cosmos, and thereby gives him, besides his 
private life, a sort of second life, his ’bios 
politikos.’ Now every citizen belongs to two 
orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinc­
tion between what is ’his own’ and what is 
’communal.' Man is not only ' idiotic,’ . he is 
also 'politic.' As well as his own ability in 
his profession or trade, he has his share in the 
universal ability of the citizen by which he is 
fitted to cooperate and sympathize with the rest 
of the citizens in the life of the polis.10
This separation divided the life of survival from the polit­
ical life of the citizen. On one side was the freeman’s
f
private life and on the other was the public life, each 
with its own special function. Furthermore, each citizen 
was equal in his ability to cooperate and participate in 
the action of the polis.
Though the household was prepolitical, the polis 
could not have existed without it. "The realm of the polis
lOwerner Jaegar, Paideai, Vol. I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1939), p, 108.
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was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a relationship 
between these two spheres it was a matter of course that 
the mastering of the necessities of life in the household 
was the condition for the freedom of the p o l i s . T h e  
household, in effect, created an abundance of things, which 
allowed the master of a household to devote his life to the 
time-consuming activities of public life. Fustel de Coulanges, 
in distinction from other writers, stresses the time-consuming 
activities demanded from the ancient citizen, rather than his 
leisure time.'^ This supports Aristotle's statement that no 
man who was primarily concerned with the necessities of life 
could be a citizen. Without the household to support him, 
the citizen would have had to work for a living, rather than 
devote full time to public life. But freed from necessities, 
the Greek citizen could participate in the political com­
munity.
The Greeks recognized that without the polis man 
could not be free, or even raise himself above other animals 
and be truly human. The fraility of the human condition in 
its private manistestations was to be alleviated by the 
polis, the political space proper.
•^Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 30.
•^Coulangest The Ancient City, p. 335,
20
The original, prephilosophical Greek remedy for 
this fraility, had been the foundation of the 
polis. The polis as it grew out of and remained 
rooted in the Greek pre-polis experience and 
estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to 
live together, namely the 'sharing of words and 
deeds’ had a two-fold function.13
The polis allowed a man to appear before others and through 
his words and deeds to show who he was in his unique dis­
tinctness. The polis also was a remedy for the hazards of 
action. While action in the private realm was usually 
dangerous and often fruitless, action in the polis could 
help the freeman gain control over his life. By coming 
together, the Greeks realized that they were all equal in 
their ability to cooperate and reach decisions on common, 
problems; and this set them apart from other animals and 
made them free.
The Greeks felt that the polis was a natural associa­
tion for men; as Aristotle tells us, "It is evident that the 
polis belongs to the class of things that exist by nature, 
and that man is by nature an animal intended to live in a 
polis."14 However, it was still men's actions, their words 
and deeds, which generated the space which was the polis.
The polis was a space generated by the freemen who spoke 
with each other. Thucydides tells us, "It is the men that
13Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 196.
14Aristotle, Politics, 1253a9.
21
15 'are the polis,” by which he meant that the polis was a .
space which evolved when men came together and spoke on
common problems.
What set man apart from other animals, and made 
him an animal capable of living in a polis, was his capac-. 
ity for speech. Arendt argues that ”to live in a polis 
meant that everything was transacted in words and persua­
sion.”-^ Speech allowed man to escape the realm of force 
and violence, the prepolitical household. Indeed, political 
action was speech; and it was his ability to speak along 
with his ability to form political associations that set 
man apart from other animals. Man was not only zoon
politikon, he was also zoon logon ekhon (a. living being
17capable of speech).
The polis was the space set aside for political 
action. As Aristotle tells us, "it is for the sake of good 
actions and not for the sake of private life, that the 
political association must be considered to e x i s t . W h e n  
the citizens c,ame together they were to interact with each 
other which meant that they only had to deal with each 
other as fellow human beings, without any physical structure
15Thucydides (ii, 34-38).
- ^ A r e n d t ,  The Human Condition, p. 26.
•^Aristotle, Nic'omachean Ethics, 1142a25 and 1178a6.
18Aristotle, Politics, 1280bl4.
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separating each individual. They came together to speak 
about the common world of things and to persuade one . 
another in a public space.
The polis was a space where men met as equals. 
Aristotle tells us, "the members of a political association 
aim by their very nature at being equal, and differing in 
nothing,"-^ When these freemen got together in the space 
generated by their words and deeds, they did so as equals. 
Within the polis there was no-rule, because the citizens 
naturally aimed at equality. No one could rule the others 
if they differed in nothing.
In Aristotle’s discussion of the differences between 
the authority of the master of the household and the author­
ity of the statesman, it is made clear that the members of a 
polis were to be free and equal.
The argument makes it clear that the authority 
of the master and that of the statesman are 
different from one another, and that it is not 
the case that all kinds of authority are, as 
some thinkers hold, identical. The authority 
of the statesman is exercised over men who are 
naturally free; that of the master over men who - 
are slaves; and again the authority generally 
exercised over a household by its head is that 
of a monarch, while the authority of the states­
man is an authority over freemen and equals.
The polis was not only a natural association in itself, but
19lbid., 1259a2. 
20Ibid., 1255a9.
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it was also natural for the members of the polis to be equal 
with one another in their capacity to speak together.
It required a degree of selflessness when these people
came together in the polis. If there was to be equality and
freedom it would demand a strong community spirit. This
spirit of selflessness would have been allowed by the
religious foundations of the polis. Fustel de Coulanges
tells us that "the foundation of the city was always a
religious act."2* The various families and tribes which
joined together in a polis "never failed to light a sacred
2 2fire and to adopt a common religion." The common religion 
resulted in public rites and sacrifices, and some instances, 
in common meals. The religious city taught the individual 
freeman to come together in public places; to remove himself 
from the private realm, and to share common activities with 
his peers. The individual was not the important entity, but 
the assembly of freeman as a whole.
The important thing here is that the common religion 
of the polis taught the citizens a degree of selflessness; 
to put the whole before the individual for the common good 
of all. This did not mean that the individual held no 
importance, (each family had its own sacred rites), it just
^Coulanges, The Ancient City, p. 133.
22Ibid., p. 127.
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meant that the citizens should cooperate with one another.
This selflessness and cooperation led to the freedom
and equality, the no-rule of the polis, hut the experience
was something entirely different in the private realm.
Other forms of association developed, such as tyranny,
which were contrary to the ideal of the polis. The ideal
of the polis, as Arendt. claims, was the freedom and equality
of isonomia. Within the polis all were to he free and equal
in their capacity to speak with one another, Tyranny, on
the other hand, was an escape from this uncertainty of
action, into the stability and order of rule, where only
one man made the choices of right and wrong and the people
conformed to these rules. Arendt says that rule rests on
a suspicion of action, and arose from the desire to find a
2 3substitute for action. This substitute for action was 
found in the rule of the household. Tyranny extended the 
rule of the household to the rest of the outside world.
Where the polis and household had been separated in space 
and function, tyranny destroyed this separation and made, the 
whole community one big household.
^Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 122.
CHAPTER III
TYRANNY
Right at your balls. No, that nurse ain't 
some kind of a monster chicken, buddy, what 
she is is a ball ■'■cutter. I've seen a thou­
sand of 'em, old and young, men and women.
Seen ’em all over the country and in the
homes--people who try to make you weak so
they can get you to tow the line, to follow 
their rules, to live like they want you 
to.--Ken Kesey
Tyranny and oligarchy (the rule of one or the rule 
of few) were based on the rule of a master over his house­
hold. The whole idea of rule was linked to life in the
household. Whether a master over his slaves, or a tyrant 
over his subjects, rulers forced people to do certain 
tasks. Arendt argues:
In Greek self-understanding, to force people by 
violence, to command rather than persuade, were 
prepolitical ways to deal with people character­
istic of life outside the polis, of home and 
family life, where the household head ruled with 
uncontested despotic powers, or of life in the 
barbarian empires of Asia, whose despotism was 
frequently linked to the organization of the 
household. 1
Under a tyranny the citizens could not come together as 
free and equal individuals to speak on political matters.
^Arendt, The Human Condition, p, 26.
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The tyrant ruled over the citizens and permitted no inter­
ference from others. While in the polis all were equal, 
tyranny, as in the household, harbored the strictest in­
equality.
Tyranny and oligarchy forced upon the people a
certain set of rules by which to live; such as all the
drudgeries of a city, while excluding them from the good
things of a city--for example, the political activity of-
speaking in public. Athenagoras, a spokesman for the
democratic party, is reported by Thucydides to have said:
But members of the same state ought in justice 
to receive the same rights. ' But I say what is 
meant by the demos, or people, is the whole state, 
whereas an oligarchy is only a sector of the state; 
and I say next that though the rich are the best 
for looking after the money, the best counsellors 
are the intelligent, and that it is the many who 
are best at listening to the different arguments 
•and judging between them. And all alike, whether 
taken all together or as separate classes, have 
equal rights under a democracy. An oligarchy 
on the other hand, certainly gives the many their 
share of dangers, but when it comes to the good 
things in life not only claims the largest share, 
but goes off with the whole lot.2
Life under a tyranny became merely a matter of survival for 
most of the people. Their life only involved those pre­
political activities concerned with the necessities of 
life, whereas they were denied the political activity of 
speaking together about the common world of things. The 
tyrant or the oligarchs ruled over the people by force,
2Thucydides (vi, 38-41),
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and thereby denied the people a chance to reason out choices ,
#
on political matters. Under a tyranny the whole idea of
1
rule, which according to our argument belongs in the pre- 
political household, became the whole way of life. Political 
action became meaningless without a place in which to exer­
cise it. Speech gave way to force, persuasion to commands. 
The community itself lost the two opposing, yet coexisting 
spheres of the household and the poiis. Action gave way to 
obedience, as the community became one big household, each . 
obeying the commands of the new master; the tyrant.
In the next section, sources from ancient Greek 
literature will be cited to show that tyranny was charac­
terized by the tools of the household master, who ruled 
with force, who commanded rather than persuaded.
Aeschylus spoke out against tyranny in his poetry
and plays. He portrays his tyrants as violent men, using
force and unlawful means to achieve control. In Prometheus
Bound, Zeus is portrayed as a tyrant who has chained
Prometheus to a cliff for disobedience. His two henchmen,
Might and Violence, personify the tools of tyranny.
Might and Violence, in you the command of 
Zeus has Its perfect fulfillment.̂
^Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, lines 11-12,
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Hephaestus, the Olympian blacksmith, has been forced to 
create the unbreakable chains used to bind Prometheus and 
he makes this clear when he complains to Might: "I am
forced to do this; do not keep urging me on."4 Zeus has 
had his henchmen drag Prometheus away to the cliffs where 
he has forced Hephaestus to chain him. There was no choice 
in the matter.
Zeus' commands, which Prometheus had disobeyed,
originated from Zeus' own private rules, and not from any
kind of public dialogue. They were merely the whim of a
despotic ruler. As the chorus says to Prometheus:
I see, Prometheus, and a mist of fear and tears 
besets my eyes as I see your form 
wasting away on these cliffs 
in adamantine bonds of bitter shame.
For new are the steersman that rule Olympus: 
and new are the customs by which Zeus rules, 
customs that have no law to them, ^
but what was great before he brings to nothingness.
If Prometheus has been chained to the cliffs for disobeying
the rule of a tyrant, there is no justice in it. Zeus has
alone decided the fate of Prometheus. The tyrant treated
his subjects like the master of the household treated its
members. The people either obeyed the tyrant's commands or
they were forced to do so.
In the Suppliant Maidens, Aeschylus portrays Egypt
4Ibid., line 72.
^Ibid., lines 144-151.
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as a tyranny. The fifty daughters of Dansus have come to 
Argos as suppliants, seeking’to avoid a forced marriage to 
their Egyptian cousins. The Argives are threatened with 
violence if they.do not surrender the suppliants but the 
Argives will not be forced by the Egyptians. They tell the 
herald of the Egyptians:
Why must you tell a name?
You and your shipmates will know soon enough;
Though were these willing, with good will of heart,
You could lead them away, if pious speech 
Persuaded them, thus unanimous the vote 
Decreed never to surrender them to force.
Joined, doweled and bolted stays the law,
That neither scratched on tablets, nor book sealed 
You hear announced by the tongue of freedom voice.
Now get out of my sight!6
The daughters of Dansus will only be led away if they can 
be persuaded to go. They will not be surrendered, to force; 
such was the way of freemen. The Egyptians^ threatened vio­
lence to get back the suppliants, instead of using persua­
sion .
While the way of freeman was to use non-violent
actions in the polis, they:
deemed it the way of wild beasts to be held 
subject to one another by force, but the duty 
of men to delimit justice by law and to con­
vince by reason.'7
Justice was the means to escape the plight of wild beasts
^Aeschylus, The Suppliant Maidens, lines 937-946, 
^Lysias, Funeral Oration, from Kagan*s Sources, p. 133.
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and their violence. Men could either be as wild beasts,
under tyrannies, or they could live in other ways as true
human beings. The ancient Greeks relied on this justice
to overcome the use of force. As early as Hesiod, force
was seen as being overcome by justice.
For justice wins over violence 
As they come out in the end.8
Justice was not present under a tyranny. The polis
was the space for justice. The people had no place to turn
to for justice if the tyrant wronged them. There was no
enclosed space in which to speak one’s defense. Tyrannies,
like the Egyptians in Aeschylus’ Suppliant Maidens, forced
people by violence, The Argives, freemen of the polis,
champions of persuasion and justice, do not allow this to
happen in their polis*
Bear not to see 
A suppliant by force 
Led from these statues,
Seized by my garments 
Like a horse by the bridle.
Do what you will,
Thy house remains to pay,
Fined in thy children:
Justice is equal. q
Mark the justice of Zeus.
Tyranny eliminated the political space of the commun-
8Hesiod, Works and Days, from Kagan’s Sources, p. 12. 
^Aeschylus, Suppliant Maidens, lines 429-438.
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ity. Tyranny removed the citizens from the public realm, 
thereby denying the space for the actions of men to be seen 
and heard by others. Tyrannies ’’all have in common the 
banishment of the citizens from the public realm and the 
insistance that they mind their own business while only 
the ruler should attend to public affairs."1  ̂ Tyranny 
was tantamount to the abolition of the public realm itself.
Tyranny rested on isolation of the tyrant from his
subjects and the isolation of the subjects from one another,.
The tyrant ruled and thereby denied himself the company of
his peers. He also prevented the people from coming together
and acting on their own initiative. Zeus, the tyrant in
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, uses forceful means to get his
way. He will not even meet with the other Olympians in
assembly. Prometheus says of him:
I know that he is savage; and his justice 
A thing he keeps by his own standard.11
Neither will Zeus allow the other gods to meet on their own.
The tyrant, to be in complete control, depended upon this
two-fold isolation, while he set alone on his throne and
made all the decisions.
Alone, the tyrant could make up his own rules, and 
then force everyone to live by them. Oceanos has tried to 
persuade Zeus to free Prometheus, but Zeus will not even
^Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 220.
fiAeschylus, Prometheus Bound, lines 188-189.
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speak to him. Oceanos tells Prometheus:
This is a tyrant's deed, this is unlovely 
A thing done by a tyrant's private l a w s . 12
Tyrannies were felt to operate in this manner. The tyrant 
kept his own private rules, much like the master of a house­
hold used force to rule his slaves. The tyrant did not use 
t-he{ political means of speaking with his fellow freemen, but 
used the prepolitical means of force to get what he alone 
wanted.
Prometheus further characterizes tyranny when he 
explains:
This is a. sickness rooted and inherent 
In the nature of a tyranny:
That he that holds it does not trust his friends. 3
This suspicion and fear were supposed to be the result of
the isolation and forceful rule of a tyrant, Aristotle
sums up the whole thing in the following:
We have here three principles to which the ordinary 
policies of tyrants may be reduced--three ideas to 
which their measures may all be referred:
1) to breed mutual distrust among their subjects
2) to make them incapable of action and
3) to break their spirit.^
By isolating himself from his subjects, and by isolating the 
subjects from themselves, the tyrant bred fear and suspicion
■^Ibid., lines 401-402.
15Ibid., lines 225-227.
14Aristotle, Politics, 1314al6.
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among the people. The people were also incapable of action 
because they had nowhere to meet as a whole. It is as if 
your neighbor might be a henchman of the tyrant, and ready 
to do you in; as if everybody was standing around with 
their hats pulled over their -eyes, afraid to talk with 
their fellow human beings.
There were those who "loved tyranny better than
15freedom," and wished to escape the uncertainty of polit­
ical action. These would have been people more interested 
in themselves and their private world of things. Tyranny 
would have allowed these people to isolate themselves in 
their households and its security, while the tyrant took 
care of the public realm himself. The people merely had 
to behave to a set of rules which the tyrant laid down.
That is why Arendt says tyranny
was not one form of government among others, 
but it contradicted the essential human con­
dition of plurality, the acting and speaking 
together, which is the condition of all forms 
of political organization.^"
Under tyranny there was no real polis at all, because with­
out the space of appearances which tyranny denies, men 
could not meet together and solve their own political 
problems; they could not be free to speak together about
!^Coulanges, The Ancient City, p. 272.
!^Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 202.
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the common world of things.
The tyrant, by the use of force, destroyed the dis­
tinction between the private realm and the public realm.
This distinction was originally produced by Greek law, 
which is discussed in the next chapter. The point here
is that the ancient Greek ideal of law was opposed to the
17use of force. "Force is the negation of law," Xenophon
tells us in his Memorablia. The tyrant made up his own
private rules outside of the legal space which was the
polis. Without this law to shelter and protect both
realms, tyranny invaded the polis with rule.
When Creon, the tyrant in Sophocle's Antigone,
commands Antigone not to bury her brother, Sophocles has
Antigone speak these words:
It was not Zeus I think who gives this decreed,
Nor justice, dweller with Gods below,
Who made appointment of such laws to men.
Nor did I think your edicts could override
The God’s unwritten and undying laws.
Then life is not today and yesterday 
But always and none knows from where they came 
I would not pay the price before the Gods 
Of breaking these for fear of any man.18
The command which Antigone defies is not a law in the true
sense, but the irresponsible rule of a tyrant. In forbidding
burial to a dead man, Creon has defied the religious laws
i^Kagan, Sources, p. 245.
18Sophocles, Antigone, lines 450-460.
of the community. His edict has no validity or claim to 
respect, because Greek law was of divine origin. Creon 
attempts to use force to back up his rules but this was 
not law, nor was it political action.
Creon was only thinking of himself when he used 
force to get his way. With all the power in his hands, 
the ruler did not have to talk with the citizens, and 
reason out his choices. He had only to decide for himself 
and force the others to behave to his rules.
Tyranny offered a remedy for the uncertainty of 
political action. By refusing to speak in public with 
the other citizens of the city, the tyrant isolated himself, 
from the people and the people from themselves. Political 
action was impossible in isolation, therefore the political 
space shrunk to one man. There was nothing uncertain about 
the rules a tyrant laid down but this process also destroyed 
the freedom of the polis, because there was no longer a 
space for the actions of the people to be seen and heard 
by others; but only the space for the necessities of life.
The tyrant ruled much like the master over his 
household, but that was just the point. As Arendt argues, 
rule belonged in the private realm where man’s survival 
was at stake. The public realm was where freedom was 
enjoyed. Tyranny in effect had no public realm, so there 
could be no freedom. The tyrant ruled over all; his
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subjects were merely slaves, and his state no state at all, 
but merely a big household.
Only when the polis and the household were sheltered 
and separated by law, was the polis a place for freedom.
Law protected the polis from the rule of the household, 
while protecting the household from the uncertainty of 
political action. The polis existed only when the actions 
and the words of its citizens generated the space. If these 
deeds and words were prevented from happening, as in the 
household or a tyranny, there was no polis at all. Law was 
a boundary between the two realms,.separating them, while 
allowing them to coexist.
We have now seen what isonomia was not. While tyranny 
was meant for the private realm, isonomia was meant for the 
public realm. The two realms were opposites, the one harbor­
ing rule, the other something different. The next chapter 
discusses law, which separated the two realms, while provid­
ing a space for the activities of each. We have seen what 
went on in the private realm, and what happened when law 
no longer separated the two realms, namely tyranny. Now we 
will see what happened when law did exist to form the wall 
between the two realms.
CHAPTER TV
LAW
The only true law is that which leads to 
freedom.--Richard Bach
We can imagine the ancient Greek people before the
polis came into existence, coming together in assemblies,
leaving their households and meeting in public places.
Over and over again in Homer's Iliad and Ody s's'ey, the Greeks
met to discuss their common problems. These assemblies
created a space much like the later polis would be. , This
space was not necessarily a physical structure, but rather
a space created by actions and words.
He found the criers with clarion voices and 
told them to muster the unshorn Akhaians in 
full assembly. The call sang out, and the 
men came streaming in; and when they filled  ̂
the assembly ground, he entered spear in hand.
These ancient assemblies were political, but were not yet a
polis. For no sooner had the assembly disbanded, than the
political space was destroyed.
On this note they were quick to end their parley.
The assembly broke up; everyone went home.^
Ĥorner, The Odyssey, Bk. II, lines 7-11. 
^Ibid., lines 260-262.
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As the polis came into being, these kinds of meetings 
represented in the Iliad and Odyssey became enclosed in a 
kind of wall, first of stone perhaps, but later of written 
law.^ This wall-like law gave the political space a 
permanence it had not had before. On one side of this 
hedge was enclosed the political life of the community, 
and on the other side was the private life of the community; 
the labor and work of men. Tlie law sheltered both sides, 
but most importantly the law'created a permanent political 
space.
Law, speech, and justice were opposed to the use 
of force, which characterized life outside the polis. It 
was law which first walled in the space wherein persuasion 
and justice were the way the citizens dealt with each 
other.
Kyrnos, this city is still the name city, 
but its people are different 
Those who before knew nothing of law suits, 
nothing of laws,
Who went in goatskins flapping over their shoulders,
Who lived on the ranges, far out from town, 
like wild deer, .
These are now the Great men, son of Polypas.
Law bounded a space where it was thought men no longer would
be as wild beasts; that is they would not be subject to the
violence of the private realm.
3Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 64.
4Theoginis of Megara, from Lattimore's Greek Lyrics.
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Hannah Arendt argues that Greek law (nomos)' origi­
nally was of a spatial significance, quite literally a wall.**
The word nomos derives from nemein which means to distribute,
to possess (what has been distributed), to dwell.^ The com­
bination of law and wall is quite manifest in this fragment 
from Heraclitus: "the people should fight for the law as
for a w a l l . G r e e k  law was like a wall between the private 
realm and the public realm, sheltering and protecting both 
realms while separating them from each other. This wall­
like law separated the political actions of the polis from 
the biological life process of the family.
The law of the city-state was neither the con­
tent of political action nor was it a catalogue 
of prohibitions, resting as all modern laws 
still do, upon the Thou Shall Nots of the
decalogue. It was quite literally a wall with­
out which there might have been an agglomeration 
of houses, a town (asty) but not a city, a 
political community. This wall-like law was 
sacred but only the enclosure was political.8
For example, the Roman word for law, lex, has an 
entirely different meaning; it indicates a formal relation­
ship between people, that was political, Legislating be­
came the highest political act. In Book IV of his Politics, 
Aristotle draws the distinction between laws given Fy 
specially appointed lawmakers and decrees, given by the 
assemblies themselves.
^Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 63.
7Ibid.
8Ibid., p. 64.
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The law was not an active process, but a static kind of 
thing, which defined the space for political activity. The 
polis could not have existed without this boundary, just as 
a piece of property could not have existed without a hedge 
to fence it in from the neighboring piece of property.
Greek law was not a day to day affair. We tend to
be more casual about our kind of law', which like Roman law,
is an ongoing political process. Greek law, on the other
hand, made the city.
With cunning beyond belief,
In subtle inventions of art,
He goes his way now to evil, now to good.
When he keeps the laws of the land
And the God’s rule which he has sworn to hold,
High is his city. No city has he 
Who in rash effrontery g
Makes wrong-doing hi.s fellow,
T
A city’s laws were like a piece of art, to be held up and 
admired. Law was a piece of architecture which made the , 
city beautiful.
Like art, law gave something that would otherwise*
have existed only for a moment, a kind of permanence; an 
immortality. Law gave the polis a permanence the town 
assemblies did not have before. It formed a relatively 
permanent wall around the political actions that went on 
from time to time in the towns and villages. Law bounded 
a space where the deeds and words of men appeared before
^Sophocles,  A n t ig o n e , l i n e s  3 6 5 -3 6 7 ,
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the public and were remembered by them and passed on to the 
next generation.
Greek law in distinction from all later developments 
was not a political phenomenon and law making was not a 
political act. Before the freemen of a town could begin 
to act and speak as equals in a polis, a lawmaker had to 
be commissioned to give the laws. The lawmaker was com­
missioned as an architect might be, to draw up this wall. 
"The lawmaker was like the builder of a city wall, some­
one who had to do and finish his work before the political 
activity could begin.nl® The lawmaking was not a political 
act in itself, but created the space for political action.
Aristotle, in his Athenian Constitution, talks
about the lawmakers of Athens, and how they gave their laws
to the city. Solon, for example, was commissioned by
Athens to make laws to end political strife. Aristotle
points out that Solon could have made himself tyrant, but
that he did not.
Solon, however, set himself against both parties 
and while he would have been able to rule as a 
tyrant if he had been willing to conspire with 
whichever party he wished, he preferred to antag­
onize both factions while saving the country and 
giving it the laws that were best 'for it, under 
the circumstances.11
^Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 194.
1 1A r i s t o t l e ,  A th e n ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n , ch. 11 .
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Rather than ruling the Athenians, Solon gave them the laws 
by means of which to work out their own problems. He did 
not take part in the political process of the polis, but 
stood apart from it and made his laws, laws which Aristotle 
tells us "can only lay down the general rules,"12 Solon, 
in talking about his laws, said: "I saw to it that they
should suffer no injustice, I stood covering both parties 
with a strong shield, permitting neither to triumph unjust­
ly."1  ̂ After he finished his work, Solon left Athens for 
ten years, fearing his prestige would interfere in the 
political process, which suggests again the wall-like charac­
ter of law. Solon did not see himself as involved in the 
political struggle, but rather as involved in providing a 
shield, or a wall.
If law was a wall, it was a wall of written words. 
What was originally only the knowledge of a few, as under 
eunomia, the rule of law, once written down became equal 
for all. When Solon gave his laws in the relatively perm­
anent form of the written word, everyone could have access 
to them. The walls became visible to all, and thus enclosed 
a larger space. In a scene from Euripides' The Suppliant 
Women, a herald from Thebes confronts Theseus, the legendary
^Aristotle, Politics, 1286a4.
13Finley, The Ancient Greeks,•p . 26,
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founder of Athenian democracy. They hold a brief conyer-
sation in which the herald challenges and Theseus defends
democracy. Theseus says:
What bombast from a herald! Waster of words,
If it is argument you want-^and you yourself 
Have set the battle going--listen. Nothing 
Is worse for a city than an absolute ruler.
In earliest times, before there are common laws 
One man has power and makes his own laws,
Equality is not yet. With written law,
People of few resources and the rich
Both have the same recourse to justice. Now
A man of means, if badly spoken of,
Will have no better standing than the weak;
And if the lesser is in the right, he wins 
Against the great. This is the call of freedom:
"What man has good advice to give the city,
And wishes to make it known?" He who responds 
Gains glory.14
Written law provided equality within the polis. Before
there was written law, Euripides said there was tyranny
where one man ruled by his own private rules. Written law,
on the other hand, allowed all men to take part in the
political realm, because within the perimeter of law all
were equal and, therefore, free to speak their thoughts.
Under eunomia, however, the walls were only visible 
for a few, the aristocracy. Eunomia was originally a radi­
cal slogan against the arbitrary rule of kings, so it did 
enlarge the walls to a certain extent. The aristocracy 
cried out for eunomia to escape the prepolitical rule of
14Euripides, Suppliant Maidens, lines 399-462.
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monarchy.1  ̂ It is as if they said, "this one man shall not 
rule us, but these laws shall." What these good laws did 
was to enclose a larger space so the aristocracy was free 
to act politically and keep out the prepolitical force of 
the private realm,
Aristotle defines eunomia as meaning "rightly con­
stituted law should be the final sovereign," and elsewhere 
he said that "where no homoi rule there is no politeia."1  ̂
Eunomia meant that no one man should rule, but that law 
should rule. If law was not ruling, there was no politeia, 
no political body, no citizens. The action of the citizens 
was to follow the general rules laid out by law, but this 
[law was not absolute. Aristotle in his discussion on 
whether the rule of law is better than the rule of the one 
best (monarchy) wrote that under eunomia "the people are 
all freemen, do nothing contrary to the law, and only act
outside it in matters which law by its nature is obliged 
17to omit." Eunomia did give a number of people a measure 
of freedom, but law was to rule them, and besides only the 
upperclasses were free from rule. They could only act where 
law failed to hit and mark, or omitted something all together.
•^Finley, The Ancient Greeks, p. 41.
1 ̂ Aristotle, Politics-, 1282hl9 and 1292a32.
17Ibid., 1286a9.
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The rule of law lifted the upperclasses out of a
life of survival in the private realm into the freedom of
the public realm.
He who commands that law should rule, may thus 
be regarded as commanding that God and reason 
alone should rule, he who commands that a man 
should rule adds the character of the beast.18
The character of the beast, we must remember, was to be sub­
ject to the use of force, and force meant the despotic rule of 
a master over his household, or a tyrant over his subjects.
Though eunomia, "the well-ordered state, ruled by 
law, was itself a revolutionary slogan," it came under attack 
from the people who replied with isonomia.19 The rule of 
law lifted some from the arbitrary rule of others, but all 
were not equal before this law. "For while the Greeks of 
the liberation hailed nomos as their charter, setting them 
free from the arbitrary rule of a tyrant, a new generation 
sprang up and began to see that nomos itself may be 
tyranny."^9 Law had become the tyrant itself. Good laws 
had given way to good order. Instead of law allowing for 
political action, the upperclasses used law to keep order; 
to prohibit some from political action. Under eunomia all 
did not have the right to speak in the polis. The people 
cried out for isonomia, equality before the law. We can 
think of isonomia as enlarging the boundary around the
18Ibid., 1287a5,
19Finley, The Ancient Greeks, p. 42.
^9T. A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political 
Thought (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1067), p. 35.
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polis to include all freemen together, not just the upper- 
classes. Within these walls all were free from arbitrary 
rule, for the reason that all were equal in the political 
space.
As early as Solon, equality before the law was 
important. Aristotle quotes Solon as saying of his laws:
"Equal laws I gave to evil and to good, with even hand
21drawing justice for the lot of each. According to
Aristotle the most praiseworthy of Solon’s laws were the
laws 1) that nobody could contract a loan secured on
his person, 2) that anyone could claim redress on behalf
of a person who had been wronged, and 3) the right to
appeal to jury court. All these laws have in common the
advancement of the idea of a community where the aristocracy
is prevented from exercising extra-legal powers; they were
steps toward equality before the law. Aristotle said that
this kind of law "declares equality to mean that the poor
are to count no more than the rich; neither is to be
22sovereign, and both are to be on a level."- It was Solon’s 
laws which declared equality, for law laid down the general 
structure of the polis. ^
Thucydides has PericlesXpraise the Athenian consti­
tution for its equality before the law.
^^Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, ch. 9. 
^Aristotle, Politics, 1291b22,
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Our constitution is called a democracy because 
power is in the hands not of a minority, but of 
the whole people. When it is a question of 
settling disputes, everyone is equal before
the law.
In Athens there were to be no arbitrary rules made to settle 
disputes. Instead, all were equal before the law, and free 
to act out the solutions themselves.
The great Athenian democratic orator, Demosthenes,
points out the equality of law. Law (jiomos) is contrasted
to nature (physis).
Be the polis in which they have their abode great 
or be it small, men’s lives are all controlled by 
nature and by nomos. Nature is something partic­
ular to each man; nomoi something common something 
identical for all men. Nature if it be evil often 
wishes for evil things; and you will therefore 
find men of that type doing wrong, Nomoi wish 
for the just and good and the beneficial: this
is what they seek; and this is what, when once 
it was found, was shown to men as a common 
injunction, equal for all and alike for all.
This not only points out the equality before the law, the
isonomia, which was essential to the polis, but also the
basic dialectic in ancient Greek political theory. Law
was the boundary, the wall, which structured this dialectic.
Law was set up so men could meet as equals for in nature,
in the household and family, they were unequal. While
tyranny was an association built on the ’natural* inequality
23xhucydides (ii, 34-38).
2^See the introduction to Barker’s translation of 
Aristotle's Politics for a discussion of this distinction.
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of the household and knew no law, isonomia was an associa­
tion of free individuals based on the equality given by 
law. Law walled out the inequality of the private realm, 
while it walled in the equality of political rights of the 
public realm.
The speaking inside the walls of the polis, the 
call of freedom, as Euripides called it, was the content 
of political action. Since law was a static thing, a 
piece of architecture, a wall if you will, it was the 
freemen's actions which were to be the important activity
25of the polis. "There were no precedents to fall back on." 
This gave the citizens the freedom to act out their own 
solutions to political matters. Once the laws had walled 
in a particular space, what actually took place was up to 
the actions and speech of the freemen. Law was prepolitical, 
but it created a space for political action.
Aristotle once wrote: "Man when perfected is the
best of animals; but if he is isolated from law and justice, 
he is the worst of all."^ Man when perfected is not 
isolated from law and justice, but lives within the polis 
which was walled in by law. We have seen how law set up 
the space for political action. Justice is the complement
2 5Finley, The Ancient Greeks, p. 25.
o c.
A r i s t o t l e ,  P o l i t i c s , 1253a l5 .
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to law in action. Where law.sets up the general rules, 
justice "is an ordering of the political association" by
individual actions. Law speaks either by some ancient
\written code or by some old and unwritten custom; justice 
is a contemporary action. "Dike Cjustice) is a showing 
of what is right in particular cases; nomos (law) is a 
general formulation or assignments of positions. Dike moves 
and bends to the case, nomos has the rigidity of a general 
rule,"27
Before there was codified law, the Greek community
did not emerge from its embryonic state in which the
arbitrary rule of a few families controlled the political
space, Hesiod called these people ’bribe^eating judges’
because justice was not equal but was ’dragged away’ for
personal gain.
Tumult arises when justice is dragged 
away and whenever 
Eaters of bribes seize her, and give ?
doom by crooked decisions.
Without equal justice there is violence, but law set up the
space where all had an equal chance to speak on his choice
of action.
Isonomia, by calling for equality before the law 
and the resultant freedom, also called for equal justice.
27Ibid,, p. lxxi,
28Hesiod, Works and Days from Kagan’s Sources, p. 14.
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As Aristotle, wrote in his Politics, ,lthe good in the sphere 
of politics is justice; and justice consists in what tends 
to promote the common interest, General opinion makes it 
consist in some sort of equality. Equal justice was the 
good in the sphere of politics, but justice was decided by 
the actions of the citizens walled in by law; citizens who 
met as equals to act and speak together. The next chapter 
discusses the actions of the citizens inside the wall-like 
law of the polis.
^9A r i s t o t l e ,  P o l i t i c s , 1 2 8 2 b l4 ,
CHAPTER V 
ACTION
According to Aristotle, what makes it worthwhile 
for men to live together in a polis is the "sharing of 
words and d e e d s . B o t h  action and speech need the pre­
sence of others to exist at all. While these two activities 
are the exclusive prerogatives of man, other activities were, 
of course, necessary for the survival of the species, but 
these activites belonged to the realm of the household.
Of all the activities necessary and present in 
human communities, only two were deemed to be 
political, and to constitute what Aristotle 
called the bios politikos, namely action (praxis) 
and speech (lexis} out of which arises the realm 
of human affairs.
Although law was prepolitical, it walled in the space for
the political activity of speech. Isonomia, as equality
before the law, meant then that all citizens who crossed
over the walls of law, from the household into the polis,
became e<̂ ual to each other while within the walls. They
were equal in their capacity to sympathize and cooperate
with each other on political matters, by speaking with
^-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1126bl2,’
2Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 24.
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each other in public. This was the bios politikos.
Man in his private life was * idiotic’--that is he 
was removed from the reality of the political realm. Those 
outside of the polis, the slaves and barbarians, were de­
prived of the political way of life. They were aneu logou,
■ *
deprived not of the faculty of speech in itself, but deprived 
of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense 
and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk to 
each other. Life outside the polis walls was concerned with 
the behavior of the people to a set of conventions. They 
were driven out of necessity to obey the commands of a 
master of the household or the ruler of a tyranny. There 
was no walled in space in which the people were free to 
speak their thoughts.
A slave is he who cannot speak his thought.--Euripides
Political action, insofar as it remained enclosed
from the sphere of violence by the wall-like law, was to be
transacted in words. Aristotle felt that it was the
faculty of speech that made man a political being.
The reason why man is a being meant for political 
association in a higher degree than bees or other 
gregarious animals can ever associate is evident.
Nature, according to our theory makes nothing in 
vain; and man alone of the animals is furnished 
with the faculty of language.
^Aristotle, Politics, 1253al0-12.
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Of course, other animals can make sounds to communicate.
These sounds, however, were only' of a biological nature
and did not constitute speech, which was necessary for the
life of the polis.
The mere making of sounds serves to indicate 
pleasure and pain, and is thus the faculty that 
belongs to animals in general: their nature
enables them to attain the point at which they 
have perceptions of pleasure and pain, and can 
signify those preceptions to one another,4
Language can do more than this. It allows man to choose
between various choices offered to him. It allows man to
group together with other men in a political association
of a high degree. Where an animal can only signify pleasure
or pain, a man can signify what he considers right or wrong.
But language serves to declare what is advan­
tageous and what is the reverse, and it there­
fore serves to declare what is just and unjust.
It is the peculiarity of man, in comparison 
with the rest of the world, that he alone 
possesses a perception of good and evil, of 
the just and unjust, and of other similar 
qualities; and it is association in these 
things which makes a polis.5
Through the use of speech man can act out choices of what 
is just and unjust, good and evil. These activites constitu­
ted the action within the wall-like laws of the polis.
Thucydides reflects this importance of sppech to
4Ibid.
5I b i d .
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the polis in Pericles' funeral oration. Pericles has been
talking about the way of life that has made Athens great.
One of the ways that has made Athens great, Thucydides
has Pericles say, is:
We Athenians in our persons, take our decisions 
on policy and submit them to proper discussions:
For we do not think that there is an incompat- 
ability between words and deeds; the worst thing 
is to rush into action before the consequences 
have been properly debated.°
Political action, what went on inside the walls of the polis,
was speech. It was here that the freemen met and discussed
their common problems. Questions of policy were discussed
among all the citizens together.
Politics was not an affair of rules and behavior to
these rules, rather the freemen talked things over, and
reasoned with one another. Speech brought the truth to
light. Fustel de Coulanges, in The Ancient City, wrote
of the Athenians:
The Athenians, as Thucydides says, did not believe 
that words could damage action. On the contrary, 
they felt the need of being enlightened. Politics 
were no longer an affair of tradition and faith.
Men reflected and weighed reason. Discussion was 
necessary and discussion alone could bring the 
truth to light. The Athenian people desired every 
question presented in all its different phases 
and to have both sides clearly shown.'
^Thucydides Cii» 41.)
^Coulanges, The Ancient City, p. 332.
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Since each person sees and hears from different points of
view, the Athenians spent a lot of time talking in the
polis. It was important to the Greeks, trying to be free
from rule. The political process of the polis depended on
the political action of speech to prevent the personal
ambitions of those who desired power for themselves from
corrupting them into using force instead of persuasion.
As Thucydides says:-
Anyone who maintains that words cannot be a guide 
to action must be either a fool or one with some 
personal interests at stake; he is a fool if he 
imagines that it is impossible to deal with the • 
uncertainties of•the future by any other medium.8
Dialogue in the polis was a means by which to deter- 
mine the proper choices to make. Everyone had the right to 
'speak his cause before the other citizens.
In Aeschylus' The Suppliant Maidens, which we have
discussed before, Pelasgus cannot make a decision before he
speaks with all the citizens in assembly.-
It is not my house at whose hearth you 
sit, and if
The Argive State stands liable to guilt therein,
The people of Argos must together work its, cure. 
Therefore, I'll undertake no pledge till I have heard 
This issue in full council with my citizens.9
This gave each citizen a chance to persuade the others to
his point of view. The suppliants must wait until the
8Thucydides ( i i , 4 2 ) ,
9A es chy lus ,  The P e r s i a n s , l i n e s  5 9 1 -5 9 6 .
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freemen of the assembly talk it over. Pelasgus, even though 
he was the archon, could not force his point of view on the 
citizens.
In Sophocle*s Oedipus the King, Oedipus has saved
the city and has been made king of Thebes. The city is,
however, being decimated from some unknown cause. Tiresias,
the blind soothsayer, is asked for guidance, He angers
Oedipus, but he answers in return:
Perhaps you are a king, but I reign too, 
in speech. I’ll have my equal say.
I’m. not your servant.10
Tiresias implies that Oedipus is being prepolitical by
treating him as a servant and not letting him have his
right to speak before the assembly: Freedom of speech was
guaranteed to all freemen in the Polis, All were equal in
their right to speak before their fellow citizens.
The whole of Greek public life was characterized
by freedom of speech. The victory over the Persians at
Salamis.was seen by Aeschylus as a victory of freedom of
speech which would have been destroyed by Persian rule.
Now fear no more shall bridle speech;
Uncurbed, the common people shall prate 
Of freedom; for the yoke of State 
Lies broken on the bloody beach 
And fields of Salamis, which hide 
The ruins of our Persian pride.11
10Sophocles, Oedipus the King, p. 39.
11A eschy lu s ,  The P e r s ia n s ,  l i n e s  5 9 1 -5 9 6 ,
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The rule of the Persians would have allowed only the rulers
to discuss political matters. The ancient Greeks felt it
was the right of all the people to speak in public on
political matters.
And I remember in frequent discourses with my 
master concerning the nature of manhood, in other 
parts of the world; having occasion to talk of 
lying and false representation, it was with much 
difficulty that he comprehended what i meant, 
although he had otherwise an acute judgement.
For he argued thus; that the use of speech was 
to make us understand one another, and to re­
ceive information of facts; not if anyone said 
the thing which was not, their ends were de­
feated. --Jonathan Swift
Along with freedom of speech went a respect for the 
truth. Perhaps no other western people found it more offen­
sive to lie. What was the use of speech as political action
1 ftif the truth was not told? "The truth is always best,"
Sophocles tells us. Pindar said of truth:
Forge thy tongue on an anvil of truth
And what flies up, though it be but a spark,
Shall have weight.12
and elsewhere:
Mistress of high achievement, 0 lady truth, 
do not let my understanding stumble 
across some jagged falsehood.1^
If speech and persuasion had any worth at all, the truth
had to be its content. Truth seems to have been well
12Edith Hamilton, The Greek Way (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Co., 1930), p. 61,
■^Richard Lattimore, ed, and trans., Greek Lyrics 
(Chicago: University pf Chicago Press, 1949), p. 63.
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respected. It was this capacity to keep everything out 
front, in the open, totally honest, that was central to 
the political realm. If the use of speech was to discover 
good and evil, what was just and unjust, the truth had to
be presented. If falsehoods*were presented, there would
be no speech at all.
If the polis was a place of freedom, then all the 
freemen had to participate in the public life of the com* 
munity. The result was the rule of one, few or many if 
only some participated. Without this responsibility for 
political action, some people ended up being ruled by 
others. Freedom not only meant the absence of rule, but 
also the responsibility to act. Without the deeds and
words of men, there was no polis at all.
It was dangerous for freemen not to participate
in the actions of the polis. Aristotle tells of a law
made by Solon:
Solon made a special law for persons of this 
kind [those who refused to act and speak in 
- the polis] enacting that whoever, in a time 
of political strife, did not take an active 
part on either side would be deprived of his 
civic rights and have no share in the state.
Solon made his laws so the Athenian not only could take an
active part in the public life, but that he had a respon-
• ^ A r i s t o t l e ,  A th en ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n , ch. 8.
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sibility to do so. By talking about things in the public 
realm, persuading and reasoning out differences, the 
citizens were kept from resorting, to violence. During this 
time in Athens, citizens could even be fined for not par­
ticipating in the councils and assemblies.
The new factor in the. development of the city- 
state, what at last makes everyman a political 
being, was the compulsion laid on each male 
citizen to take an active part in the life of 
his community, and to recognize and accept his 
civic duties--which were quite different from 
his duties as a private person and workingman.“
It was each citizen’s community only if he was active in it.
The polis was made up of his words and deeds along with
those of the rest of the citizens, To ignore his duties
as a public person was to destroy the political community.
In a reference from Thucydides, Pericles describes
the Athenian citizen as a freeman, actively involved in the
public realm. Those who for private gain do not participate
in politics, he says, have no right to be in the polis.
We do not say that a man who takes no interst in 
politics is a man who minds his own business; we 
say he has no business here at all.1®
To speak in the public realm was to be the business of the
Athenian citizen. The ancient Greeks had a responsibility
to participate in the public discussions. The responsibility-
15Jaegar, Paideia, p. 88.
■^Thucydides Cii> 38^41). In more recent times, 
political action became a techne, a profession, the business 
of a few professionals.
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of the community was to be in the hands of all the freemen.
The tyranny of this dictatorship isn't primarily 
the fault of Big Business, nor of the demagogues 
who do their dirty work. It’s the fault of 
Doremus Jessups! Of all the conscientious, 
respectable, lazy minded Doremus Jessups, who 
have let the demagogues wriggle in, without 
fierce enough protest.--Sinclair Lewis '
This responsibility to participate in the political
action of the polis took great courage. One of the classic
forms of political excellence, according to Aristotle, was .
courage.
It is not wolves, or other savage animals that 
will fight a good fight in the presence of a 
noble danger; it is the man who is of a good 
courage.
It took courage for the Greeks to leave the safety of their
households, and enter the noble dangers of the public realm,
The Greeks had the valor; and during a time when the rest
of the world was shrouded in fear, the Greeks "changed a
18world full of fear, into a world full of beauty." This
was why courage was one of the original forms of political
excellence. We think of only heroes as being courageous
but Homer used the term hero (herbs) merely as a name given
19each freeman who participated in the Trojan enterprise.
l7Aristotle, Politics, 1338b5.
T O Hamilton, The Greek Way, p. 176.
19See Herodotus, ch. vi and vii for the entire battle.
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To leave the household and to devote one’s life to 
the affairs of the polis demanded courage because only in 
the household was one concerned with one’s survival. To 
enter the public realm, one had to be ready to risk his 
life and without it one could not leave a life of necessity 
for the freedom of the public realm. Only those who had 
the courage to live a life away from the security of the 
household, could be admitted to a "fellowship that was
political in content and purpose and thereby transcended/
the mere togetherness imposed on all--slaves, barbarians, 
and Greeks alike--through the urgencies of life."2® Political 
man thus needed the courage to overcome the innate urge of 
all animals to care only for their own survival. Once he 
did so he was no longer tied to the biological life process 
and could enter the public realm where he could enjoy the 
freedom of the world.
The freeman also needed the courage to face the 
uncertainties of political action. Though law attempted 
to place a boundary around the actions of the citizens, 
it never could quite overcome the boundlessness of action. 
Every time someone acted he set in motion a new beginning, 
and there was no way to tell exactly where it would lead. 
Action by its very nature establishes new relationships;
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and isonomia allowed all the freemen to act in the polis. 
The consequences were always unpredictable. Law somewhat 
contained this chaos, but everyone sees and hears from a 
different position, so the chaos always continued. It 
took courage to live with this uncertainty, for no one 
knew one day what would happen the next, except that they 
would be free.
Somewhat paradoxically, what finally made the un-' 
certainty of political life bearable, was that each had 
his own private world, his household, into which he 
could escape. The two spheres of the household and the 
polis went hand in hand. The wall-like law which separated 
the realms at least protected the private realm from the 
uncertainties of public life. Each citizen could escape 
into a place all his own, with its relative peace and 
quiet.
While it took courage to enter the public realm and 
to make it a place of freedom, it took a brave spirit for 
the Greeks to defend this freedom against the overwhelming 
odds of the invasion of the tyrannical Persians. Other 
cities quickly surrendered, but i.the Athenians would not.
Herodotus tells the story of a Persian official who 
was urging some Greeks to submit to him. They answered 
this Persian by saying: "Freedom you have never tried,
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to know how sweet it is. If you had you would have urged
us to fight not with our spears only, hut even with our
21hatchets.” They did not want to be ruled by a tyrant.
They would fight for their freedom with undying courage.
When the Athenians resisted the attack of the
Persians, they showed the courage it took to preserve the
freedom they possessed. When Xerxes offered the Athenians
surrender terms, he offered them much but not their freedom.
They answered him: ”tell the General that the Athenians
say as long as the sun moves in his present course, we will
22never come to terms with Xerxes.” Later, just before the 
Persian attack at Salamis, the Greek leaders, chosen in 
assembly by their fellow freemen, told their men, "when we
2 *7join in battle, before all else remember freedom.” °
Aeschylus, who was there, has them shouting, as they
advanced upon the foe:
For freedom, sons of Greece
Freedom for country, children, wives
Freedom for worship, for our father's graves. 4
It was the courage of the citizens, who were now
engaged in battle, that also set up the polis and its freedom.
2 ~̂Ibid.
22Herodotus Cvii).
25Ibid., Cii, 41).
2^Aeschylus,  The P e r s i a n s , l i n e s  401 *4 03 .
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It was this same courage which was to protect their freedom 
from the rule of the Persians. What they resisted at
i' t
Salamis, was what Prometheus resisted alone on the cliff; 
the forceful rule of a tyrant. The Persian army was an 
army of slaves, forced on by tyrannical powers. Several 
times Herodotus pictures the Persian army being whipped 
on into battle from behind, while the Athenian army
25courageous and free, marches forward to meet the foe.
What they were resisting was slavery, where one was ruled 
by despotic forces. They were defending a way of life, 
where freedom was directly opposed to the Persian tyranny.
The Athenians were freemen, they were brave men. 
Courage was inherent in the Greek's way of life. "Make 
up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and
9 f\freedom depends on being courageous."
2^Herodotus Cvi). 
26Ibid.
CHAPTER V I
CONCLUSION
Creation is a marvel 
And man its masterpiece;
He scuds before the southern wind 
Between the loud white-piling swell. 
He drives his thoroughbreds 
Through Earth (perpetual 
Great goddess inexhaustible) 
Exhausting her each year.
The light-balanced light-headed birds 
He snares; wild beasts according to their kind. 
In his nets the deep sea fish are caught-- 
0 master mind of Man!
The free forest animal he herds,
The roaming upland deer.
The shaggy horse he breaks to yoke 
The mountain-powered bull.
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He's trained his agile thoughts 
(Volatile as air)
To civilizing words.
He's roofed against the sky 
The javelin crystal frosts 
The arrow-lancing rains.
All fertile in resource 
He's provident for all 
(Not beaten by disease)
All but death, and deaths 
He never cures»
Beyond imagining he's wise
Through labyrinthine ways both good and bad; 
Distinguished in his city when 
He is law-abiding, pious;
But displaced when he promotes 
Unsavory ambition.
And, then, I want no part with him,
No parcel of his thoughts.
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In his two years of dictatorship,
Berzilius Windrip daily Became more 
of a miser of power. And daily he 
wanted louder, more convincing Yeses 
from everybody about him.--Sinclair Lewis
Around 430 B.C. Pericles of Athens had said: "Al-
though only a few may originate a policy, we are all able 
to judge it."'*' This contrasts so sharply with the tyrannies 
which followed the fall of Periclean Athens. During the 
late sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Athens had been a place 
of political freedom, with all citizens alike interacting 
in the polis. Each freeman was capable of acting indepen­
dently initiating new ideas or judging those of others.
But something happened to this freedom, this idea of no­
rule: within a generation political freedom had been re­
placed by the rule of kings, of emperors.
What appears to have finally destroyed the freedom 
of the Athenian polis was the greed for power that corrupted 
even the worthiest of intentions. Athens had created an 
empire after she had defeated Persia. At first she had 
resisted the temptations of power, but finally she submitted. 
It was inevitable. The joy that is written into Herodotus' 
history of the defeat of the tyrannical Persians and the 
blossoming of freedom, is absent from the pages of Thucydides' 
history of the by now tyrannical Athenians. Thucydides has
•^Thucydides Cii»41).
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Pericles give this warning to the Athenians:
Do not think you are fighting for the simple 
issue of letting this or that state become 
free or remain subject to you. You have an 
empire to-lose. You must realize that Athens 
has a mighty name in the world because she has 
never yielded to misfortune and had today the 
greatest power that exists. To be hated has 
always been the lot of those who have aspired 
to rule over others. In face of that hatred 
you cannot give up your powers-even if some 
sluggards and cowards are all for being noble 
at this crisis. Your empire is a tyranny by 
now, perhaps, as many think wrongfully acquired, 
but certainly dangerous to let go.
While trying to spread their way of life to other cities,
the Athenians had become corrupted by the power they gained
over others. The temptation to acquire more power had, as
always, proved irresistible.
Herodotus believed that the concentration of power 
corrupted a tyrant, and caused him to become a violent and 
forceful person. It was not so much that the Greeks mis­
trusted power; power generated by the speaking together of 
citizens kept the polis together. What they feared was the 
power of the whole body-politic concentrated in the hands 
of one or a few. This concentrated power was bound to 
corrupt the tyrant. Herodotus has Otanes, the spokesman 
for isonomia explain it this way:
Such license is enough to stir strange and 
unwanted thoughts in the hearts of the most 
worthiest of men. Give a person this power
2 Ibid., Cii,65).
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and straight away his manifold good things puff 
up with pride, while envy is so natural to human 
kind that it cannot but arise in him. But pride 
and envy together include all wickedness, both 
leading to savage violence.3
Tyranny led to a state of violence, Power degenerated into
force and violence when it was no longer the product of men's
deeds and words in public life, but the Creation of 'pride*
and 'envy.' The tyrant might even have started out as a
very just person, but the tyrant's power corrupted him.
With tyranny "the love of power, operating through 
personal ambition was the cause of these evils,namely 
the conditions of force and violence. The tyrant was an 
egoist whose "first thought was always for himself."^ With 
his pride inflated he no longer cared for the community as 
a place for citizens to come together and share in the 
problems of living together. The tyrant was self-oriented; 
his policies were directed at gaining absolute power for 
himself. The people were only pawns. Power, Thucydides 
wrote, created the desire for more power. There was no 
right power for him, because power, whoever wielded it, 
was evil, the corruptor of men.
One hundred and fifty years earlier, Solon had said
3Herodotus (iii,80).
^Thucydides (iii,82),
5Ibid., Ci,17).
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the same thing. He saw as Thucydides was to see, that
power worked out in evil and that the greed for power
destroyed the polis.
Men are driven on by greed to win wealth in 
unrighteous ways, and he who has most wealth 
covets twice as much. Powerful men pull the 
city down.®
This concentrated power, based on the wealth of the house­
hold, eventually led to the corruption of the ruler and the
«
state. Great power brought on its own destruction and soon 
enough the tyranny itself would be destroyed. So it happened 
to Athens,
The poet, Aeschylus, wrote of the fate of those who
wielded too great a power. The Gods, he wrote, hated this
arrogance of power, and they passed harsh judgment over
those who became too greedy for more.
All arrogance will reap a harvest rich in teach,
God calls men to a heavy reckoning
For overweening pride.?
He almost foresaw the bitter fate of the Athenians, who in
the pride their great strength inspired, initiated the
imperialism which destroyed their way of life.
*
What had been "the fairest of names" and that most 
"beautiful word"--isonomia--became a joking matter just a
^Solon, frg. 3.
^Aeschylus, The Persians, lines 820-823.
71
generation after Athens fell. Plato, in his discussion of 
democracy and freedom in the Republic, makes a farce of 
freedom.
No one who had not seen it would believe how 
/ much more freedom the domestic animals enjoy 
in a democracy than elsewhere. The very dogs 
behave as if the proverb 'like mistress like 
maid' applied to them; and the horse and donkeys 
catch the habit of walking down the street with 
all the dignity of freemen, running into everyone 
who does not get out of their way. The whole 
place is simply bursting with the spirit of 
freedom.®
Equality and freedom, once a way of life in the polis, became 
a farcical situation, a matter of animals running wild in 
the streets.
The absence of rule, a state without an all powerful 
leader led to uncertainty and chaos, said the political 
thinkers such as Plato. Under isonomia the freeman would
q"spend his days indulging in the pleasure of the moment," 
but it was exactly this chaos that was important to the 
political realm. In their capacity to make and judge polit­
ical decisions all freemen were equal under isonomia. This 
freedom to act politically led to an open community that was
certainly chaotic, yet limited to a certain level of reality
by the wall-like law. Even so this equality before the law 
became associated with mob violence.
®Plato, The Republic (viii, 563). 
^Ibid., (viii, 561).
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The proponents of rule, on the other hand, isolated 
individuals from themselves and from each other. They in­
vented a million ways to tell people apart but forgot that 
everyone should be equal in their ability to control their 
own actions. Suddenly man had a leader, a big brother to 
tell him what to do on every occasion,' It became the 
responsibility of a few professionals to decide the policies 
of a people.
The people under the rule of these leaders, became 
apathetic about political life, and sunk deeper and deeper 
in the quagmire of private life as they slipped into 
acceptance of their serfdom. They were told from birth 
that they are not responsible to act in public affairs--
leave it up to the government, they were told. The over-
*
riding problem became again a matter of survival. They 
had no control over the policy decisions which decide their 
fate as private individuals,
Against the supposed violence and uncertainty of 
action, political thought brought from the private realm, 
as it were, the concept of rule. To escape the respon-' 
sibilities of action, as the ancients knew it, some decided 
it would be better to let a few rule and the rest be ruled. 
They wished to escape from the basin of politics altogether, 
so they made it the responsibility of only a few or even one 
to decide on questions of right and wrong. What was onee
7'3
only the prerogative of a master over his household, now
was the right of the ruler over his subjects.
The greatest principle of all is that nobody, 
whether male or female, should be without at 
leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be 
habituated to letting him do anything at all 
on his oton initiative; neither out of zeal 
nor even playfully. But in war and in peace-- 
to his leader he shall direct his eye and follow 
him faithfully. And even in the smallest matter 
he should stand under leadership. For example 
he should get up, or move, or wash or take his 
meals only if he has been told to do so. In a 
word, he should teach his soul, by long habit 
never to dream of acting independently and to 
become utterly incapable of it.10
Plato of Athens, not even a generation after the fall of
the Athenian polis had already denied the freedom that was
*
part of the political life of each freeman.
The action that originally went on inside the walls 
of the polis was the words of the freeman talking about 
common problems. Any force or violence or rule was completely - 
out of place. Men were to persuade through speech, to 
reason out their choices among themselves in public life 
which was lived out in the open. What.one felt or thought 
was freely expressed in completely honest dialogues out 
where all could interact. Each person had a responsibility 
to participate in the open community forum, no public life
Karl Pepper paraphrases Plato on page 7 of 
the Open Society and Its Enemies.
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was exposed to the actions of everyone of the citizens.
Greek law originally walled in this space for action. 
It protected it from the competition and violence of the 
private realm, where men did not act but conformed to a set 
of rules. The whole idea of the polis was based on an 
escape from the violence and rule of the private realm, 
into the freedom of tjie public realm. Law secured a space 
in which the political activities of speech and persuasion 
could take place, without interfering with the life of sur­
vival in the household.
The emphasis on the actions of all freemen being 
freely exercised in the open spaces leads to the conclusion 
that isonomia, equality before the law, also meant no-rule 
as Hannah Arendt argues. Within the polis walls no one was 
to rule or be ruled; rather on this level all were equal 
with one another and free to speak their thoughts on polit­
ical matters. Thucydides' Otanes expressed this idea when 
he said he wished neither rule or be ruled. Each citizen, 
by being free from necessity and being free from,rule, was 
free to act and speak in public. ,,
Actually, equality before the law said the same 
thing. All freemen were to be equal while within the law 
of the polis. This meant that no one ruled over others 
inside this space. Equality before the law gave the Greeks
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political freedom. What made the Greek citizen free was 
that he only had tb deal with his equals, and could thus 
be assured that no one would rule over him.
Rule, on the other hand, was connected with the 
strictest inequality. Men were not free in the private 
realm because they were ruled by necessity and by a leader. 
The master of the household ruled with tyrannical powers; 
he commanded and people obeyed. The members of the house­
hold were not equal with one another because only one or a 
few made the decisions, while the rest were forced to behave 
accordingly.
Yet the Greeks needed both realms at the same time. 
Without a private space in the world, a place of one’s,own, 
where one mastered the necessities of life by violence, by 
ruling and being ruled, the Greek citizen was not free to 
spend his life in the common world of things, among his 
peers in the polis. Also, he needed an occasional escape 
from the chaos of action in the polis, into the quiet and 
order of the household, his sanctuary in the world. The 
polis could not have been a place of freedom without the 
household to provide the necessities of life. If law was 
a wall, then it separated and sheltered both realms from 
one another. It kept the rule of household out of the 
polis, and the uncertainty of action from the life of 
necessity. The wall-like law allowed both realms to
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coexist; it thus insured the co*?existence of the life of 
survival with the freedom of the world.
Political thought has since that time turned away 
from action. Political scientists have forgotten that 
though we are all different we are still the same in our 
capacity to be political. To be political requires the 
absence of rule, yet political thought since Plato has 
assumed that some must rule and others must obey. The study 
of politics has actually become the study of means by which 
to escape from political action altogether, for political 
scientists now study the behavior of people to the rules of 
governments, where freedom is a freedom from the respon­
sibility of action. The political associations they study 
are actually not political at all in the original sense of 
the word; rather they are methods of administering a giant 
household. We have thus' lost the true meanings of our 
political language which is found not in a political science 
book, but in the plays and poetry and histories of ancient 
Greece.
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